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Comment
Attorney's Fees As an Element of Damage for
the Dissolution of Illegally Issued
Conservatory Writs
Louisiana Code of Practice of 1870, Article 375, as amended
by Louisiana Act 50 of 1886, provides ". . that in all cases of
arrest, attachment, sequestration, provisional seizure and injunc-
tion, the defendant may in the same suit, by reconventional
demand, recover from the plaintiff the damages he may have
sustained by the illegal resort to such writ."
This article is the broad authority for granting damages to
defendant when a conservatory writ has been issued illegally
or improvidently. Since conservatory writs are harsh remedies,
they should not be lightly resorted to; thus, the attitude of the
law is that a person responsible for the improper issuance of a
conservatory writ must be prepared to redress all such damages
as he may have occasioned the other party.' One element of
these damages is reasonable attorney's fees expended in obtain-
ing the dissolution of the illegal writ.
If plaintiff is in good faith in causing the writ to issue, he
will be held for only "actual" damages. However, there is some
authority that he may also be held for punitive damages if he acts
maliciously.2 At the time of recovery it is not necessary that the
attorney's fees actually have been paid, but defendant must have
1. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sneed, 167 La. 432, 119 So. 417
(1929).
2. Barrimore v. McFeely, 32 La. Ann. 1179 (1880); Cretin v. Levy, 37 La.
Ann. 182 (1885); Riggs & Co. v. Bell, 42 La. Ann. 666, 7 So. 787 (1890); Bloch
v. His Creditors, 46 La. Ann. 1334, 16 So. 267 (1894); American Hoist & Derrick
Co. v. Frey, 127 La. 183, 53 So. 486 (1910); Wall v. Hardwood Mfg. Co., 127 La.
959, 54 So. 300 (1911).
See also General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sneed, 167 La. 432, 444, 119
So. 417, 421 (1929) and Finance Security Co., Inc. v. Mexic, 188 So. 657, 661
(La. App. 1939), both of which suggest that punitive damages would be
allowed in a proper case. Yet in Vincent v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S.
Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917), the supreme court clearly held that there
is no authority in Louisiana for awarding punitive damages in civil cases.
This point seems now to be well settled. McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas
Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383 (1932); Moore v. Blanchard, 216 La. 253, 43 So. 2d
599 (1949),
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actually incurred the obligation to pay.8 Although it would seem
that no one is better qualified than the district judge to deter-
mine the reasonable value of the legal services rendered, such
value must be proved as any other fact.4 If an injunction is suc-
cessfully maintained against the execution of a judgment under
a writ of fieri facias, the plaintiff in injunction is usually allowed
damages, including attorney's fees, on the theory that this mat-
ter is quite similar to the illegal issuance of a conservatory writ."
Obviously no one should be allowed damages for the success-
ful defense of a suit instituted against him; thus, the only dam-
ages allowed are those traceable directly to or incidental to the
writ and its dissolution.a Ordinarily damages are not allowed
when the writ has been dissolved only because it is lacking in
some matter of form, such as the affidavit being signed by the
attorney instead of the party personally.
7
Under the present jurisprudence it is very difficult to recover
attorney's fees for dissolution of an improperly issued conserva-
tory writ. The cases seem to require that a motion to dissolve
the writ must be filed and tried separate and apart from the
merits, and that the motion cannot even be referred to the merits
without precluding any subsequent claim for attorney's fees.8
3. Wilcox v. Bandy, 13 La. 38 (1838); Farrar v. New Orleans Gas Light &
Banking Co., 2 La. Ann. 873 (1847); McRae v. Brown, 12 La. Ann. 181 (1857);
Whitney-Central Nat. Bank v. Sinnott, 136 La. 95, 66 So. 551 (1914); Burglass
v. Villere, 170 La..805, 129 So. 209 (1930); General Finance Co. of La. v. Veith,
177 So. 71 (La. App. 1937).
4. Usually other attorneys testify as expert witnesses. Roos v. P. Gold-
man & Bro., 36 La. Ann. 132 (1884); Watkins Banking Co. v. Louisiana Lbr.
Co., 47 La. Ann. 581, 17 So. 143 (1895); Douglas Public Service Corp. v. Leon,
196 La. 735, 200 So. 21.(1941).
5. Soniat v. Whitmer, 141 La. 244, 74 So. 916 (1916). See also White v.
Givens, 29 La. Ann. 576 (1877); Willis v. Scott, 33 La. Ann. 1026 (1881); Chap-
puts v. Waterman, 34 La. Ann. 58 (1882); Gilkerson-Sloss Com'n Co. v. Yale &
Bowling, 47 La. Ann. 690, 17 So. 244 (1895); Ludeling v. Garrett, 50 La. Ann.
118, 23 So. 94 (1898); Rivet v. Murrell Planting & Mfg. Co., 121 La. 201, 46
So. 210 (1908); Alfano v. Franek, 159 La. 498, 105 So. 598 (1925). See Town-
send v. Sheriff, 42 La. Ann., 890, 8 So. 616 (1890) and Compton v. Dietlein &
Jacobs, 118 La. 360, 42 So. 964 (1907), where attorney's fees were denied.
6. Horn v. Bayard, 11 Rob. 259 (La. 1845); Norton & White v. Cammack,
10 La. Ann. 10 (1855); Collins v. Edwards, 13 La. Ann. 342 (1858); Lemeunier
v. McClearley, 41 La. Ann. 411, 6 So. 338 (1889); Ivers v. Ryan, 42 La. Ann.
32, 7 So. 61 (1890); Levert v. Sharpe, 52 La. Ann. 599, 27 So. 64 (1900); Three
Rivers Oil Co. v. Laurence, 153 La. 224, 95 So. 652 (1923).
7. Phelps & Co. v. Boughton, 27 La. Ann. 592 (1875); Barry v. Union
Sulphur Co.,.167 La. 227, 119 So. 30 (1928); Calavartenos v. S. E. Raw Fur
Merchants of La., 189 La. 94, 179 So. 46 (1938). Contra: Hollinsworth v.
Atkins, 46 La. Ann. 515, 15 So. 77 (1894).
8. Crowell & Spencer Lbr. Co. v. Duplissey, 130 La. 837, 58 So. 590 (1912);
Three Rivers Oil Co. v. Laurence, 153 La. 224, 95 So. 652 (1923); In re Morgan
& Co. v. DeRidder Light & Power Co., 155 La. 915, 99 So. 696 (1924); Dehan
v. Youree, 166 La. 635, 117 So. 745 (1928); Roy 0. Martin Lbr. Co, v. Sinclair,
56 So. 2d 240 (La. 1951).
COMMENTS
The theory of the rule is that it is "impossible" to separate the
portion of the attorney's services rendered in dissolving the writ
from that directed toward defeating the main demand, unless a
motion to dissolve has been tried separately. Since attorney's
fees cannot be allowed for defeating the main demand, all claim
for fees is rejected. The rule was succinctly stated in Farris v.
Swift:
".. . whenever an attachment or other conservatory writ is
dissolved after hearing the merits, or so that it is impossible
to differentiate between the attorney's services for dissolving
the attachment and those for defending the suit, such attor-
ney's fees cannot then form an element of the damages to
be allowed for the wrongful issuance of the writ, 'for to do
so would be to allow the fees virtually for defending the
suit on the merits, which is not permissible.' "9
The purpose of this comment is to evaluate this rule and to
show that it is neither supported by necessity nor the early juris-
prudence of this state.
SUMMARY OF EARLY JURISPRUDENCE
The early cases consistently allowed attorney's fees for the
dissolution of illegally issued writs and show that the judiciary
also entertained a proper regard for the high value of an attor-
ney's services.10
In Jones v. Doles," an 1848 case, Doles had caused certain
logs belonging to Jones to be sequestered under a claim that the
logs were the property of his debtor. The only issue tried was
ownership of the logs, and there was judgment on the merits for
Jones. Despite the fact that the writ was dissolved on the merits,
when Jones later brought an action for damages,' 2 the supreme
9. Farris v. Swift, 156 La. 12, 17, 99 So. 893, 894 (1924).
10. Farrar v. New Orleans Gas Light & Banking Co., 2 La. Ann. 873 (1847)
(injunction-500); Herford v. Babin, 14 La. Ann. 333 (1859) (injunction-
$500); British & American S.S. Navigation Co. v. Sibley & Co., 27 La. Ann.
191 (1875) (attachment-500); Brandon & Co. v. Allen & Co., 28 La. Ann. 60
(1876) (attachment-$1800); Frank & Co. v. Chaffe & Sons, 34 La. Ann. 1203
(1882) (attachment-500); Aiken v. Leathers, 40 La. Ann. 23, 3 So. 357 (1888)
(injunction-500); Chaffe, Powell & West v. MacKenzie, 43 La. Ann. 1062, 10
So. 369 (1891) (attachment-1000); Martin v. Tellotte, 115 La. 769, 40 So. 41
(1905) (injunction-$250); Wall v. Hardwood Mfg. Co., 127 La. 959, 54 So. 300
(1911) (sequestration and attachment-$500).
11. 3 La. Ann. 588 (1848).
12. It was not until the 1886 amendment to the Code of Practice Article
375 that a reconventional demand for damages was allowed in tjhe same
suit when th@ parties were residents 9f the same parishr
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court allowed the reasonable expense of counsel employed in
defending the former suit. Two years later, in Penny v. Taylor,18
a sequestration was coupled with the main demand. The only
response was an answer filed to the merits, and the writ was dis-
solved after trial. Attorney's fees paid for defense of the original
suit were $250. The court pointed out that plaintiff could recover
only the portion fairly due for the services relating to the release
of the writ and set this value at $150. In Gray, Macmurdo & Com-
pany v. Lowe & Pattison (1856) 14 a rule to set aside an injunction
was discharged without prejudice to the parties, and after trial on
the merits the injunction was dissolved. In awarding attorney's
fees the court discussed the Jones and Penny cases and announced
that plaintiff could recover only that portion of the amount paid
counsel which was expended for services relating to the dissolu-
tion of the injunction. The court had no difficulty in determining
that, out of the total $500 paid by plaintiff to his attorney, $100
was a reasonable fee for dissolving the writ. None of these cases
required that the writ be dissolved on the trial of a motion or
rule to dissolve, rather than on the merits, as a condition prece-
dent to the recovery of attorney's fees for the dissolution of the
illegal writ.
The practice of apportioning the attorney's services was fol-
lowed for a number of years. Attorney's fees were allowed for
the dissolution of illegally issued writs whether the writs were
dissolved on motion or rule,'5 on motion or rule referred to and
tried with the merits,16 or simply upon the trial of the merits.17
13. 5 La. Ann. 714 (1850). See also Dyke v. Walker, 5 La. Ann. 519 (1850),
where attorney's fees were awarded when sequestration dissolved after trial
on the merits.
14. 11 La. Ann. 391, 392 (1856).
15. Ricard's Heirs v. Hiriart, 5 La. 244 (1833) (injunction); Conrey v.
Elbert, 2 La. Ann. 18 (1847) (civil arrest); Brown v. Lambeth, 2 La. Ann. 822
(1847) (injunction); Bridge v. Ennis, 28 La. Ann. 309 (1876) (attachment);
Meaux v. Pittman, 35 La. Ann. 360 (1883) (injunction); Roos v. P. Goldman &
Bro., 36 La. Ann. 132 (1884) (civil arrest); MacFarland & Dupre v. Lehman,
Abraham & Co., 38 La. Ann. 351 (1886) (attachment); Watkins Banking Co.
v. Louisiana Lbr. Co,, 47 La. Ann. 581, 17 So. 143 (1895) (attachment); Bick-
ham v. Hutchinson, 50 La. Ann. 765, 23 So. 902 (1898) (attachment); American
Furniture Co. v. Grant-Jung Furniture Co., 50 La. Ann. 931, 24 So. 182 (1898)
(sequestration); Levert v. Sharpe, 52 La. Ann. 599, 27 So. 64 (1900) (injunc-
tion); Yun Loy v. Rosser, 52 La. Ann. 1723, 28 So. 251 (1900) (sequestration).
16. Hernsheim & Bro. v. Levy, 32 La. Ann. 340 (1880) (attachment);
Seeligson & Co. v. Rigmaiden & Co., 37 La. Ann. 722 (1885) (attachment);
Chaff e, Powell & West v. MacKenzie, 43 La. Ann. 1062, 10 So. 369 (1891)
(attachment); Vives v. Robertson, 52 La. Ann. 11, 26 So. 756 (1899) (sequestra-
tion); Billington v. Poitevent & Favre Lbr. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1397, 27 So. 725
(1900) (attachment); American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Frey, 127 La. 183, 53
So. 486 (1910) (sequestration).
17. Stetson v. LeBlanc, 6 La. 266 (1834) (sequestration); Melancon's Heirs
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The only limitation upon the granting of attorney's fees was
that they were not allowed for defense of the suit on its merits
or for prosecuting the suit for damages. In Accessory Transit
Company v. McCerren, an 1858 case in which an attachment was
dissolved as an incident of trial on the merits, the court expressed
the apportionment rule like this:
"In regard to lawyer's fees, as an element of damage in this
class of cases, it seems now to be settled ... that, although
no separate fees have been stipulated for services rendered
in relation to the attachment, as contradistinguished from
the defense of the suit at large, yet the court may assess as
damages . . . such proportion of the whole fee paid counsel
.. as it may deem reasonably applicable in remuneration of
services peculiarly relating to the attachment." (Italics
supplied.) I
In Brandon & Company v. Allen & Company (1876) and State
v. Robichaud's Heirs, 19 La. 357 (1841) (injunction); Offutt v. Edwards, 9 Rob.
90 (La. 1844) (attachment); Horn v. Bayard, 11 Rob. 259 (La. 1845) (attach-
ment); Littlejohn v. Wilcox, 2 La. Ann. 620 (1847) (attachment); Farrar v.
New Orleans Gas Light & Banking Co., 2 La. Ann. 873 (1847) (injunction);
Jones v. Doles, 3 La. Ann. 588 (1848) (sequestration); Dyke v. Walker, 5 La.
Ann. 519 (1850) (sequestration); Penny v. Taylor, 5 La. Ann. 714 (1850) (seque-
stration); Fleetwood v. Dwight, 8 La. Ann. 481 (1852) (provisional seizure);
Norton & White v. Cammack, 10 La. Ann. 10 (1855) (sequestration); Gray,
Macmurdo & Co. v. Lowe & Pattison, 11 La. Ann. 391 (1856) (injunction);
McRae v. Brown, 12 La. Ann. 181 (1857) (injunction); Herford v. Babin, 14
La. Ann. 333 (1859) (injunction); Phelps v. Coggeshall, 13 La. Ann. 440
(1858) (attachment); Accessory Transit Co. v. McCerren, 13 La. Ann. 214
(1858) (attachment); Williams v. Close, 14 La. Ann. 737 (1859) (injunction);
Bonner v. Copley, 15 La. Ann. 504 (1860) (sequestration); Dickinson v. May-
nard, 20 La. Ann. 66 (1868) (attachment); British & American Nay. Co. v.
Sibley & Co., 27 La. Ann. 191 (1875) (attachment); Brandon & Co. v. Allen &
Co., 28 La. Ann. 60 (1876) (attachment); Heffner v. Hesse, 29 La. Ann. 149
(1877) (injunction); Bernard v. Vicknaire, Man. Unrep. Cas. 371 (1880)
(sequestration); Barrimore v. McFeely, 32 La. Ann. 1179 (1880) (provisional
seizure); Frank & Co. v. Chaffe & Sons, 34 La. Ann. 1203 (1882) (attachment);
Byrne & Co. v. Gardiner & Co., 33 La. Ann. 6 (1881) (attachment); Aiken v.
Leathers, 40 La. Ann. 23, 3 So. 357 (1888) (injunction); Ivars v. Ryan, 42 La.
Ann. 32, 7 So. 61 (1890) (provisional seizure); Riggs & Co. v. Bell, 42 La. Ann.
666, 7 So. 787 (1890) (injunction); Bloch v. His Creditors, 46 La. Ann. 1334,
16 So. 267 (1894) (attachment); Fush v. Egan, 48 La. Ann. 60, 19 So. 108
(1896) (sequestration); Armistead v. Ardis, 48 La. Ann. 320, 19 So. 278 (1896)
(injunction); State Bank of New Iberia v. Martin, 52 La. Ann. 1628, 28 So.
130 (1900) (attachment); Elms v. Wright-Blodgett Co., 106 La. 19, 30 So. 315
(1901) (injunction); Martin v. Tellotte, 115 La. 769, 40 So. 41 (1905) (injunc-
tion); Wall v. Hardwood Mfg. Co., 127 La. 959, 54 So. 300 (1911) (sequestra-
tion and attachment); American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Frey, 127 La. 183,
53 So. 486 (1910) (sequestration); Buras v. Machella, 172 La. 580, 134 So. 751
(1931) (injunction); In re Pargoud v. Morgan, 2 La. 99 (1830) (injunction);
Walker v. Miltenburg, 22 La. Ann. 375 (1870) (sequestration; attorney's fees
were allowed for dissolution of the writs, but it is not clear by what pro-
cedure the writs were dissolved).
18. 13 La. Ann. 214, 215 (1858).
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Bank of New Iberia v. Martin (1900)',"' after trial on the merits,
the trial court rendered' judgment in favor of the attaching cred-
itors and maintained the attachments. In both cases the supreme
court reversed on appeal, dissolved the attachments, and appor-
tioned attorney's fees sufficient to cover the services rendered in
dissolving the writs. In Barrimore v. McFeely (1880)20 final
judgment was rendered rejecting the lessor's demands and set-
ting aside a writ of provisional seizure. The lessee was awarded
the fees of the attorney employed for her defense under the writ.
In Byrne & Company v. Gardiner & Company (1881)21 there was
judgment on the merits for the attaching creditor but the attach-
ment was dissolved as being illegally issued. The court appor-
tioned the attorney's fees to the value of the services rendered
in dissolving the attachment.
Aiken v. Leathers (1888)22 involved an injunction applied
for in federal court. In the damage action brought in state
court, defendant argued that plaintiff was not entitled to attor-
ney's fees, since the dissolution of the restraining order did not
result from any separate proceeding for dissolution, but flowed
from the refusal of the injunction pendente lite. There was no
formal hearing of a motion to dissolve the restraining order prior
to the hearing on the injunction pendente lite. Yet the court
allowed attorney's fees of $500 for professional services rendered
in effecting the dissolution of the writ.
In both Hernsheim & Brothers v. Levy (1880') and Chaffe,
Powell & West v. Mackenzie (1891) ,23 a motion to dissolve an
attachment because of the falsity of the allegations of the grounds
for the writ was referred to and tried with the merits. Judgment
was rendered for defendant on the merits and the attachment
was dissolved. The court determined a "just estimate" of the
services of counsel in dissolving the writ.24 In an 1896 case where
a sequestration was dissolved on devolutive appeal to the supreme
court, the court allowed attorney's fees, stating, "It is well set-
tled that if a sequestration issues illegally, the defendant in the
writ can recover as damages as the fee of counsel only the amount
19. BrandorX & Co. v. Allen & Co., 28 La. Ann. 60 (1876); State Bank of
New Iberia v. Martin, 52 La. Ann. 1628, 28 So. 130 (1900).
20. 32 La. Ann. 1179 (1880).
21. 33 La. Ann. 6 (1881).
22. 40 La. Ann. 23, 3 So. 357 (1888). Fees also allowed in Riggs & Co. v.
Bell, 42 La. Ann. 666, 7 So. 787 (1890).
23. Hernsheim & Bro. v. Levy, 32 La. Ann. 340 (1880); Chaffe, Powell &
West v. Mackenzie, 43 La. Ann. 1062, 10 So. 369 (1891).
24. See cases cited note 16, supra.
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proportioned to the service for dissolving the writ." 25 (Italics
supplied.)
SOURCE OF RULE PRESENTLY FOLLOWED
The earliest case found which cast doubt on the applicability
of the apportionment rule was McDaniel & Company v. Gardiner
& Company (1882), where the court stated:
"We cannot include the counsel fees, for defending the attach-
ment suit, in the damages. No motion was made to dissolve
the attachment, and the answer filed was purely a defense
to the merits, and when the suit was dismissed, the attach-
ment went with it. In such cases, only the fee exclusively
for dissolving the writ can be allowed, and here there was
no such exclusive .or distinct service rendered." 26
This case is the first judicial indication found that the "fee
exclusively for dissolving the writ" can only be determined when
the writ is dissolved upon a motion filed and tried separate and
apart from the merits of the case. The court cited no authority
at all, and, as shown above, there was a considerable body of
judicial authority to the contrary at this time. Again no motion
or rule to dissolve the writ was filed in either Cretin v. Levy2
or Adam Brothers v. Gomila & Company,2 8 both decided in 1885.
The reasoning of the McDaniel case was followed in both cases,
and the only damages allowed were the fees of the attorney in
bonding the writs. It should be noted that in neither case did
the court specifically state that attorney's fees were disallowed
because the writ was dissolved on the merits rather than on a
motion to dissolve. Instead, the court emphasized that these were
the only damages relating exclusively to the issuance of the
writ, and that fees incurred in defending the prior suit could not
be allowed. Chief Justice Bermudez dissented strongly in the
Adam Brothers case. Again in Lemeunier v. McClearley (1889)29
the dissolution of an injunction was only incidental to the rejec-
tion of plaintiff's main demand. The court refused attorney's fees,
stating that it could allow only those damages resulting exclu-
sively from the operation of the injunction.
All of the above cases cited the McDaniel case, which itself
25. Fush v. Egan, 48 La. Ann. 60, 64 (1896).
26. McDaniel & Co. v. Gardiner & Co., 34 La. Ann. 341, 344 (1882).
27. 37 La. Ann. 182 (1885).
28. 41 La. Ann. 411, 412 (1889).
29. Id. at 412.
1952]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
was supported by no authority at all. Other cases relied on were
Byrne & Company v. Gardiner & Company, Penny v. Taylor,
Phelps v. Coggeshall, and Accessory Transit Company v. McCer-
ren, all of which expressly allowed attorney's fees after dissolu-
tion on the merits, as shown above.
The McDaniel case and the three cases following it are appar-
ently an isolated group. All cases found in the period after these
cases, down to about 1910, apparently applied the earlier rule and
allowed attorney's fees without regard to the manner in which
the writ was dissolved.80 Seeligson & Company v. Rigmaiden &
Company,8 1 decided in the same year as the Adams Brothers and
Cretin cases, apportioned attorney's fees without discussion when
a motion to dissolve an attachment was referred to and tried with
the merits. Thus it appears that at this stage the court was not
yet committed to the rule that trial on the merits precludes an
award of attorney's fees for dissolution of the writ.
In American Hoist & Derrick Company v. Frey (1910) 82 a
motion to dissolve a sequestration was referred to and tried with
the merits, and it was decided that the writ was wrongfully
issued. Plaintiff argued that no attorney's fees could be allowed
since the motion was tried at the same time as the merits. The
court expressly rejected this view, saying that it is only where
the writ is dissolved as a result of trial solely on an answer to
the merits that attorney's fees will be disallowed. But, said the
court, such fees may be allowed when the motion to dismiss or
dissolve is tried at the same time as the merits. Albert Hanson
Lumber Company v. Mestayer (1912) 3 denied attorney's fees
where no effort to obtain dissolution of an injunction was made
prior to trial on the merits, but indicated that the rule of the
American Hoist case would be followed in a proper case.
Crow-ell & Spencer Lumber Company v. Duplissey. (1912)
was the earliest case found in which a claim for attorney's fees
was rejected expressly upon the following reasoning:
"It is well settled that attorney's fees for dissolving a writ
30. See cases cited supra notes 15, 16, 17. See especially Aiken v. Leathers,
40 La. Ann. 23, 3 So. 357 (1888); Riggs & Co. v. Bell, 42 La. Ann. 666, 7 So.
787 (1890); Chaffe, Powell & West v. Mackenzie, 43 La. Ann. 1062, 10 So. 369
(1891); Bloch v. His Creditors, 46 La. Ann. 1334, 16 So. 267 (1894); Vives v.
Robertson, 52 La. Ann. 11, 26 So. 756 (1899); Elms v. Wright-Blodgett Co., 106
La. 19, 30 So. 315 (1901).
31. 37 La. Ann. 722 (1885).
32. 127 La. 183, 53 So. 486 (1910).
33. 130 La. 688, 58 So. 511 (1912).
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of sequestration can be allowed only when trial on the writ
has been separate from that on the merits." 34 (Italics sup-
plied.)
No authority was cited to sustain the proposition. It was evi-
dently about this time that the courts began to feel definitely
committed to the present-day rule that trial on the merits pre-
clude attorney's fees. Other cases of the same period are in
agreement with this view, as appears below.
SUMMARY OF THE MODERN JURISPRUDENCE
In Mitchell v. Murphy (1913) 85 a sequestration and an attach-
ment were dissolved on motion to dissolve, but a sequestration
subsequently taken out was disposed of at the same time as the
merits. The court allowed attorney's fees for dissolving the first
two writs, but denied them for dissolution of the second sequestra-
tion. Jones v. Monroe (1914) 36 likewise held it to be "impossible"
to determine what portion of the attorney's services related to
the dissolution of the writ when a motion to dissolve a sequestra-
tion was referred to the merits. Attorney's fees were again rejected
in 19211 when an injunction was dissolved on the merits and
not on motion to dissolve.
Three Rivers Oil Company v. Laurence (1923) 8 is the case
most frequently cited as authority for the modern rule. There,
defendant filed motions to dissolve writs of injunction and seque-
stration which were referred to the merits without prejudice to
either party. As it turned out, defendant actually was preju-
diced, since the supreme court, after affirming the trial court's
decision that the writs were illegally issued, refused to allow
attorney's fees for the dissolution, stating:
"While it is true that a motion to dissolve the writ of injunc-
tion was filed, and was referred to the merits without preju-
dice to either party, yet it is also true that this motion
involved a trial on the merits, and that the injunction was
in fact dissolved on the merits and not on the motion. Under
the circumstances, attorney's fees will not be allowed as
damages, for to do so would be to allow fees virtually for
defending the suit on the merits, which is not permissible." 8
34. 130 La. 837, 843, 58 So. 590, 592 (1912).
35. 131 La. 1040, 60 So. 677 (1913).
36. 136 La. 148, 66 So. 760 (1914).
37. Kavanaugh v. Frost-Johnson Lbr. Co., 149 La. 972, 90 So. 275 (1921).
38. 153 La. 224, 95 So. 652 (1923).
39. 153 La. 224, 231, 95 So. 652, 654 (1923).
1952]
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The court did not explain why it could not evaluate the work
done by the attorney in preparing the motion, and no authority
was cited.
The Farris case was decided the next year and since then
the rule has been strictly followed in every case found, with one
.exception.40 It appears that the modern jurisprudence does not
apply the rule of the American Hoist & Derrick case. For ex-
ample, in Edwards v. Wiseman (1941)41 the claim for attorney's
fees was rejected despite the fact that defendant had referred a
motion to dissolve a temporary restraining order to the merits
with express reservation of his right to claim them. The modern
rule has been affirmed in a 1951 case, Roy 0. Martin Lumber
Company v. Sinclair,42 which, allowed attorney's fees, but the
court carefully pointed out that the motion to dissolve the writ
was separately tried. Other cases also allow attorney's fees if the
motion to dissolve is tried separate from the merits.43 Although
doubt was expressed in a few cases, 44 it now seems established
that attorney's fees may be recovered for the dissolution of a
temporary restraining order. 5
CONCLUSION
The modern cases appear definitely committed to the "impos-
sibility" rule, that is, that it is impossible to differentiate be-
tween the attorney's services for dissolving the writ and those
for defending the suit unless a successful motion to dissolve the
40. Buras v. Machella, 172 La. 580, 134 So. 751 (1931).
41. 198 La. 382, 3 So. 2d 661 (1941).
42. 56 So. 2d 240 (La. 1951).
43. Byrd v. Cooper, 166 La. 402, 117 So. 441 (1928) (sequestration); Gen-
eral Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sneed, 167 La. 432, 119 So. 417 (1929) (attach-
ment); Cupples Co., Manufacturers v. Baskowitz, 172 La. 254, 134 So. 83
(1931) (attachment); Louisiana State Rice Milling Co. v. Potter, 179 La. 197,
153 So. 690 (1934) (sequestration); Price v. Foster, 182 La. 79, 161 So. 161
(1935) (attachment); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service
Comm., 183 La. 741, 164 So. 786 (1935) (injunction); Esmele v. Violet Trap-
ping Co., 187 La. 728, 175 So. 471 (1937) (sequestration); Younger Bros. Inc. v.
Spell, 194 La. 16, 193 So. 354 (1939) (provisional seizure); Douglas Public
Service Corp. v. Leon, 196 La. 735, 200 So. 21 (1941) (attachment).
44. Albert Pick & Co. v. Stringer, 171 La. 131, 129 So. 731 (1930); Vidal v.
Sterlington Gas Corp., 182 La. 19, 161 So. 6 (1935).
45. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm., 183
La. 741, 164 So. 786 (1935); Bogalusa Ice Co. v. Moffett, 188 La. 598, 177 So.
679 (1937). See also Whitney-Central Nat. Bank v. Sinnott, 136 La. 95, 66 So.
551 (1914); Whitbeck v. Rea, 158 La. 1003, 105 So. 43 (1925), same result before
1924 injunction statute. This is at best illusory since plaintiff in injunction
can set trial on the rule for the preliminary injunction at such an early date
that defendant will not have time to file a motion or rule to dissolve the
restraining order.
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writ has been separately filed, tried, and decided.46 It seems just
as clear that the early jurisprudence allowed attorney's fees as
an element of damages in every case in which a conservatory writ
was illegally issued, it making no difference whether the writ
was dissolved on a separate motion to dissolve, on a motion to
dissolve referred to the merits, or upon the merits after answer
only was filed.47 It is not easy to understand why modern courts
find it "impossible" to apportion the fees when the older courts
did not even express it to be difficult. The procedural law has
not changed in any great particular (except for injunctions, and
attorney's fees are allowed when a temporary restraining order
is dissolved on motion or rule tried separate from the rule
nisi) .48 Perhaps the "impossibility" rule is followed because of
a feeling that, as a matter of public policy, damages for the
improper, but good faith, issuance of conservatory writs should
be limited. However, no indication of such policy was found in
any of the cases, and Code of Practice Article 375 would seem to
set out a contrary policy. More likely the rule is followed be-
cause of the throttling effect of "stare decisis." 49
In two cases,50 one decided in 1928 and one in 1942, motions
to dissolve the writs issued were overruled prior to trial on the
merits, but the trial judges dissolved the writs after hearing the
merits. The claim for attorney's fees was refused in each case.
In three earlier cases 5' (1876, 1896, and 1900) no motions to dis-
solve at all were filed. In each case the trial judge gave judgment
on the merits for plaintiff and sustained the writ; yet, on appeal,
the supreme court, after deciding that the trial court's judgment
46. See cases cited in notes 35, 36, 43 and 44, above; Farris v. Swift, 156
La. 12, 99 So. 893 (1924) (attachment); In re Morgan & Co. v. DeRidder Light
& Power Co., 155 La. 915, 99 So. 696 (1924) (injunction); Fabacher v. Rouprich,
160 La. 433, 107 So. 295 (1926) (sequestration); Smith v. Keith Motors Co., 163
La. 395, 111 So. 798 (1927)1 (sequestration); Socola Rice Mill v. Gitz, 165 La.
984, 116 So. 407 (1928) (sequestration); Dehan v. Youree, 166 La. 635, 117 So.
745 (1928) (provisional seizure); Montgomery v. Bouanchaud, 179 La. 312, 154
So. 8 (1934) (injunction); Kupperman v. Moore, 185 La. 1000, 171 So. 104
(1936) (provisional seizure); Department of Conservation v. Reardon, 200
La. 491, 8 So. 2d 353 (1942) (temporary restraining order).
47. See Jones v. Doles, 3 La. Ann. 588 (1848); Penny v. Taylor, 5 La. Ann.
714 (1850); Accessory Transit Co. v. McCerren, 13 La. Ann. 214 (1858), and
cases cited supra notes 15, 16, 17.
48. See cases cited supra notes 43 and 44.
49. For example, the Three Rivers Oil case (153 La. 224, 95 So. 652 [1923])
has been cited as authority for the rule in some 14 later cases, while the
case itself cited no authority and made no attempt to explain the rule.
50. Socola Rice Mill Co. v. Gitz, 165 La. 984, 116 So. 407 (1928); Depart-
ment of Conservation v. Reardon, 200 La. 491, 8 So. 2d 353 (1942).
51. Brandon & Co. v. Allen & Co., 28 La. Ann. 60 (1876); Fush v. Egan,
48 La. Ann. 60, 19 So. 108 (1896); State Bank of New Iberia v. Martin, 52 La.
Ann. 1628, 28 So. 130 (1900).
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on the merits was incorrect, dissolved the writ and apportioned
the attorney's fees. And for almost every other modern case
denying attorney's fees an identical or very similar earlier case
can be found which allowed attorney's fees.52
Thus it appears that, contrary to the statement in Farris v.
Swift quoted above, it is not actually "impossible to differentiate
between the attorney's services for dissolving the attachment and
those for defending the suit." 53 The one valid exception to the
allowance of attorney's fees, however, might be the rule an-
nounced in American Hoist & Derrick Company v. Frey54 (but
seldom followed) to the effect that, when the only response to
a suit coupled with a conservatory writ is an answer, and the
writ is dissolved solely because the merits of the case are with
defendant, no counsel fees will be allowed. But even this excep-
tion should be placed upon grounds of public policy rather than
"impossibility," in view of the many cases which have allowed
attorney's fees under such circumstances. 55
It is submitted that a return to the prior rule regarding
attorney's fees would be desirable. Even when the motion to
dissolve is referred to the merits, attorney's fees are certainly
an element of the "damages he [the defendant] may have sus-
tained by the illegal resort to such writ." 56 Furthermore, the
line of cases stretching over an eighty year period, from 1830
to about 1910, provides ample jurisprudential authority for such
a move, and as said by Chief Justice Bermudez in his dissent to
Adam Brothers v. Gomila & Company, it should be "indifferent
to the defendants that two counsel were not employed, one to
dissolve the writ, another to resist the claim." 57 Neither should
it be material that the technical procedure of Williams v. Ralph
52. For example, compare two cases where injunctions were dissolved
when the only trial had was upon the merits-Crowell and Spencer Lbr. Co.
v. Duplissey, 130 La. 688, 58 So. 511 (1912) (attorney's fees denied) and Melan-
con's Heirs v. Robichaud's Heirs, 19 La. 357 (1841) (attorney's fees appor-
tioned). Compare Jones v. Monroe, 136 La. 148, 66 So. 760 (1914); Kavanaugh
v. Frost-Johnson Lbr. Co., 149 La. 972, 90 So. 275 (1921); Three Rivers Oil Co.
v. Laurence, 153 La. 224, 95 So. 652 (1923); Smith v. Keith Motors Co., 163
La. 395, 111 So. 798 (1927), where attorney's fees were rejected when motions
to dissolve were referred to and tried with merits, and cases cited in note 16,
supra, where fees were apportioned under the same circumstances. Compare
cases cited in note 17, supra, with those cited in note 45.
53. 156 La. 12, 17, 99 So. 893, 894 (1924).
54. 127 La. 183, 53 So. 486 (1910).
55. See especially Jones v. Doles, 3 La. Ann. 588 (1848); Penny v. Taylor,
5 La. Ann. 714 (1850); Phelps v. Coggeshall, 13 La. Ann. 440 (1858); Accessory
Transit Co. v. McCerren, 13 La. Ann. 214 (1858).
56. Art. 375, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
57. 37 La. Ann. 479, 481 (1885).
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R. Miller Shows"5 was not followed, that is, of insisting that the
motion to dissolve be tried immediately before the merits proper
and that separate records be maintained.
John V. Parker*
Mineral Rights-Forced Pooling Under
Louisiana Act 157 of 1940
In the field of mineral law, private ownership and contrac-
tual rights and obligations have been increasingly subjected to
the needs of an advancing economy, a development typical of
modem law. The passage of Act 157 of 19401 began a new chap-
ter in Louisiana mineral law and some significant problems
concerning the rights of landowners and owners of mineral rights
have arisen in the slightly more than a decade since the enact-
ment of this statute.
This comment will not discuss the basic constitutional issues
of the act, which have already been well settled.2 One of the
most interesting problems in mineral conservation arises from
the authority conferred by the act on the commissioner of con-
servation to establish compulsory drilling and production units.3
This specific area is the main concern of this comment.
The overall purposes of this legislation and the resulting
orders of the commissioner are to obtain the maximum possible
production of oil and gas from underground pools and to pre-
vent the drilling of unnecessary wells. The basis. of the unitiza-
tion orders is that there is a coequal right in landowners whose
tracts cover a common pool to take from this source. Forced
pooling is used to protect these common owners.4
58. 17 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 1944). See also Kavanaugh v. Frost-Johnson
Lbr. Co., 149 La. 972, 90 So. 275 (1921); Byrd v. Cooper, 166 La. 402, 117 So.
441 (1928); Albert Pick & Co. v. Stringer, 171 La. 131, 129 So. 731 (1930); Vidal
v. Sterlington Gas Corp., 182 La. 19, 161 So. 6 (1935); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Louisiana Service Comm., 183 La. 741, 164 So. 786 (1935).
* Graduate of February, 1952; presently an officer in the United States
Army, Judge Advocate General's Department.
1. La. R.S. (1950) 30:2-20.
2. The act was upheld as a valid exercise of the police power of the state
and a proper delegation of authority to the commissioner of conservation in
the case of Hunter v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So. 2d 495 (1942), appeal dis-
missed 320 U.S. 222 (1943).
3. La. R.S. (1950) 30:4(13), 9, 10.
4. Louisiana Gas Lands, Inc. v. Burrow, 197 La. 275, 1 So. 2d 518 (1941).
For a complete explanation of the conservation program and its administra-
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